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Abstract

Simple Malthusian models remain an important tool for understanding pre-modern
demographic systems and their connection to the economy. But most recent literature has lost
sight of the institutional context for demographic behavior that lay at the heart of Malthus’s own
analysis. This paper estimates a short-run version of a Malthusian model for two Württemberg
communities from 1646 to 1870. Württemberg differed institutionally from the northwest
European societies analyzed in previous studies. The impact of institutional differences shows
clearly in differing demographic reactions to economic shocks. Mortality was less sensitive to
shocks than one would expect, while nuptiality was especially sensitive.
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Malthusian ideas now lie at the heart of discussions of population and its
relationship to the economy. In their Population History of England (1981), Wrigley and
Schofield argued that Malthus’s preventive check worked particularly strongly in earlymodern England, especially in comparison with France, and helps explain the English
economy’s earlier and more robust development. A more recent line of research, usually
called “unified growth theory,” starts from economic models of long-run growth, and
tries to integrate population into that picture. This literature uses the term “Malthusian” in
a much looser sense, but most versions focus on changing demographic behavior as the
key to sustained economic growth.1
Social institutions have hitherto been largely absent from these discussions – a
surprising gap given their importance for Malthus himself and in modern microeconomic
theories of demographic behaviour. This paper brings institutions back into the story,
focusing on how they regulated economic decisions, demographic behavior, and the
relationship between the two. The society we study here – the south German territory of
Württemberg – gave local communities, occupational guilds, and the state much stronger
power to regulate residence, occupation, and marriage than was the case in England,
France, or other societies of the northwest Atlantic seaboard. We see the demographic
implications of these institutions in the models reported below. Institutions form a central
research agenda in economic history today, but they seem to have gone missing from the
literature on historical population and its relationship to the economy. Malthus of course
grounded his hopes for long-term economic growth in changing institutions, especially in
reducing the incentive for the poor to undertake “early and improvident” marriages. By
1

The unified growth literature tries to understand long-run growth by integrating endogenous population
into economic models of growth. The most visible figure is Oded Galor. See, for example, Galor and Weil
(2000).
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re-asserting the role of institutions in demographic behavior, we hope to nudge the
literature toward a broader and more useful understanding of this central issue in long-run
economic growth.
This literature now contains contributions on many different regions of Europe
and indeed around the world. We focus here on the way the people of Wildberg and
Ebhausen, two small communities in Württemberg, responded to price shocks in the
period 1646-1870. Württemberg had a different kind of institutional organization than
most European regions studied thus far. For one thing, its state institutions were militarily
hyperactive but fiscally inefficient, repeatedly involving the country in expensive and
disastrous wars from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. It secured domestic
support for these ventures by enforcing the powers and privileges of local corporative
institutions, particularly guilds and local communities.2 Much has been written about
guilds recently, and there is a small literature on how guilds and related institutions affect
demographic behavior.3 Communal institutions have also attracted growing attention in
the literature on demography, economic development, and “social capital”.4 Our results
challenge some of what is in the literature, and support the view that these institutions in
fact constrained demographic and economic opportunities for many people.
This paper is part of a larger project on long-run demographic and economic
development in this part of Germany. The next step is to use family reconstitution
methods to study the determinants of marriage, fertility and mortality in three
Württemberg communities – these two and one other. Because we have individual-level
2

Wilson (1995); Vann (1984); Ogilvie (1997, 1999).
Braun (1978); Hardwick (1998); Hermann (2005); Lee (1999); Ogilvie (1997, 2003); Taylor (1994).
4
Fertig (2000); Ogilvie (1997, 2003, 2004); Dennison and Ogilvie (2007); Rosero-Bixby, Collado and
Seligson (2005); Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1994); Montgomery and Casterline (1996); Bongaarts and
Watkins (1996).
3
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data, we will be able to address some questions that must remain open here. And because
we can link the demographic information to a wide array of variables that describe
wealth, occupation, office-holding, etc., we will be able to advance the relevant historical
demography literature considerably.5 This paper, however, explores a crucial initial issue:
how this central European demographic system, regulated institutionally by the state,
occupational guilds, and local communities, responded to economic shocks. Family
reconstitution techniques, with all their strengths, cannot address this question completely
because their findings relate to the “reconstitutable minority”. The approaches used in
this paper, by contrast, capture the demographic responses of the whole population. This
is especially important given that many European societies – including the German
society analysed here – institutionally prevented certain groups from marrying, excluding
them from appearing as adults in a family reconstitution. We use techniques here that
capture this otherwise invisible section of the population.6
The next section describes the Malthusian model and its relationship to the shortterm models we estimate and report below. Section 2 turns to the demographic and
economic background, that is, Wildberg and Ebhausen, their social institutions, and their
place in the regional economy. We next describe the underlying data sources and
providing a summary overview of the demographic series for Wildberg and Ebhausen in

5

These family reconstitution studies, linked to socioeconomic data from other historical sources, are being
undertaken in the context of a project entitled “Economy, Gender, and Social Capital in the German
Demographic Transition”, supported by the Leverhulme Trust (F/09 722/A); for further details, see
http://www.hpss.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/germandemography/.
6
A recent literature uses family-reconstitution techniques to ask how specific life-course events respond to
economic shocks. See Bengtsson and Dribe (2006) for an example dealing with fertility. Breschi, Fornasin,
and Gonano (2005) use published official demographic data to study the impact of price shocks on
mortality at different ages in Tuscany. This method, where it is feasible, has the virtue of working with the
demographic behavior of the entire population. We intend to pursue approaches similar to Bengtsson and
Dribe with our family reconstitutions, bearing in mind the limitation of the “reconstitutable minority” that
underlies such work.
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this period. Section 4 describes our econometric methods, and Section 5 reports our
results.

1. The Malthusian Model
Economists and others employ the term “Malthusian” too broadly, often using it
when what they really mean is a poor economy, or one in which mortality seems to them
especially high. We find it most useful to stick to what Malthus argued. The model
consists of three equations. The first says that births are a function of the real wage. The
second says that deaths are also a function of the real wage. The third says that the real
wage is a negative function of the number of people using a given stock of capital and
natural resources. Our focus in this paper is to estimate the central elasticities in the first
two equations: the effects of real wage shocks on births and on deaths.
Figure 1 reproduces a summary of the Malthusian model originally devised by
Ron Lee. On the right-hand side, we see the expectation that as the real wage increases,
births increase and deaths decrease. The equilibrium population growth rate, zero, occurs
at the real wage that equates births to deaths. The left-hand side shows two marginal
product of labor schedules. The lower schedule produces that equilibrium growth rate –
zero growth – for a population of size N0 . This equilibrium illustrates the role of
economic productivity in the Malthusian model: the marginal product of labor schedule
does not determine the real wage, which is instead determined by the demographic
schedules on the right-hand diagram; rather, it determines the size of population
consistent with zero population growth. The second, higher marginal product of labor
schedule illustrates the effect of an economic shock in this model. Suppose unusually
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good weather raises productivity above its normal level. Population size is fixed in the
short run, so the effect of better productivity is to raise the real wage. At that higher real
wage, however, demographic behavior is out of equilibrium: we expect to see a higher
birth rate and a lower death rate. This simple comparative-static thought experiment
illustrates the identification strategy used in this paper.
Two observations are needed to avoid some of the confusion that has been
introduced into the literature. First, the dependence of births on the real wage is mediated,
according to Malthus, by marriage. This link reflects what later historians called the
“Western European Marriage Pattern,” which is based on the social (and sometimes
legal) expectation that couples will not marry until they can afford to support themselves
and any children.7 This expectation implies that age at marriage and the chance of
marrying at all depend on the real wage. In the simplest Malthusian model there is no
fertility control within marriage; ages at marriage and proportions who marry fully
determine fertility (at least stochastically). This central assumption is testable, and part of
our modeling amounts to tests of that assumption. Second, there is no sense in which a
Malthusian model is inconsistent with technological change or necessarily implies a poor
population. All it requires is that, as in Figure 1, the equilibrium real wage be a function
of demographic decisions. The third equation assumes only that the marginal product of
labor is declining for a given stock of capital and a given state of know-how. There is
nothing “Malthusian” about this feature of the model; it is central to most neoclassical
models of economic growth.

7

Hajnal (1965, 1982) describes the Western European Marriage Pattern and how it affects population
dynamics.

8

Nobody would be surprised to learn that a shock to incomes raised death rates or
reduced fertility. What makes the model interesting is knowing how strong these effects
are, and how the strength of each effect varies across societies and time-periods. This was
Malthus’ own approach in the Second Essay. Throughout this paper we use the English
and French cases as points of comparison for our two Württemberg communities.
Much of the interest in formal Malthusian models since The Population History of
England reflects some complex issues inherent in the model. The model we have
described contains only endogenous variables. Lee (1985) and others stressed the
difficulty of identifying this model using long-run data. But Lee also observed that in the
short run, the model is easily identified. In a period of say three or four years, one can
treat population size as approximately fixed. This implies that any shocks to the real
wage are due to movement of the marginal product of labor schedule, as illustrated in
Figure 1, and not movement along the schedule.8
Focus on the short run neatly deals with another serious issue in the Malthusian
model. The long-term dynamics of human populations imply that over a generation or
more, there will be movements in births and deaths that are echoes of earlier population
movements rather than a behavioral response to current shocks. Suppose, for example,
that there was a spike in fertility 25 years ago. Today, without any change in individual
behavior, there will be another spike in fertility, simply because there is now a large

8

Earlier papers in this literature all employ the same or similar econometric techniques. But in some cases
(for example, Galloway (1988); Hammel and Galloway (2000); Bengtsson and Dribe (2005); Breschi,
Fornasin, and Gonano (2005)) the authors interpret their results as demonstrating the way populations react
to economic stress. Reactions to stress in fact identify the parameters of the Malthusian model. Bengtsson
and Dribe (2005) push the analysis further, arguing that the way populations react to shocks can help the
historian understand mechanisms of savings and credit, as well as formal and informal social-welfare
systems. We agree.
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cohort of young women entering their child-bearing years.9 Once again, the short-run
analysis allows us to avoid this problem.

2. The Württemberg Communities of Wildberg and Ebhausen
The demographic data we analyze come from the communities of Wildberg and
Ebhausen in the Württemberg Black Forest. The Duchy (after 1806 Kingdom) of
Württemberg was a middle-sized state in southwestern Germany – what has been called a
“German territory of the second rank” (Vann 1984, p. 36). It had about half a million
inhabitants in 1600, sustained serious population lossess in the Thirty Years War (16181648), but recovered again to 320,000 by 1700, 640,000 by 1797, 1.7 million by 1849,
and just above 2 million in 1900 (Boelcke 1987, pp. 93-6, 165, 215). For most of its
history, Wildberg was the capital of one of Württemberg’s 45-60 districts, administering
itself and 10-12 villages, one of which was Ebhausen. Although Wildberg had the legal
status of a town, it was very small, with a population of about 1500 in 1625, 1100 in
1650, 1300 in 1700, 1500 in 1750, 1700 in 1800, and 1800 in 1850, falling again to 1300
by 1900. Ebhausen, as a village, started out much smaller but grew faster, with a
population of about 200 in 1650, 350 in 1700, 650 in 1750, 1000 in 1800, and 1600 in
1850 (nearly equalling Wildberg), but then falling back to 1200 by 1900. The relative
size and growth trajectories of our two communities can be seen in Figure 2.

9

We in fact have access to population totals, but do not use them in this paper, in order to maintain the
parallel to other literature. Papers that use a long-run version of a Malthusian model must “filter” the data
to distinguish between extraneous changes such as echo effects and the underlying trends. Lee and
Anderson (2002) use a state-space representation of the Malthusian system with Wrigley and Schofield’s
English data. They find estimates of the preventative and positive check much more similar to the short-run
estimates reported in Galloway (1988), Lee (1981), Weir (1984), and others on non-English societies.
Reher and Ortega Osona (2000)’s analysis of England, northern Italy, and northern Castile relies on
techniques that require less econometric structure, but impose a priori the relevant time-span for the
relevant relationships.
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Germany was the battlefield of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and the territory of Württemberg was no exception. It was repeatedly
devastated by warfare, partly inflicted exogenously but also exacerbated by its
institutional structure, which enabled its rulers to alternate between conspicuous
consumption and destructive military ventures – often both at once – as during the Thirty
Years War (1618-1648), the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697) (during which
Württemberg was repeatedly invaded by the French), the Seven Years War (1756-63), the
French Revolutionary Wars (during which Württemberg fought on both sides), the Seven
Weeks War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1). The one constant
characteristic of Württemberg’s rulers was their extravagance and consequent willingness
to sell monopolies and other economic “privileges” to powerful interest-groups in return
for fiscal favours (Ogilvie 1999; Vann 1984; Wilson (1995)).
Württemberg, like most of the German south, was economically undynamic
between the late sixteeenth century and the mid-twentieth. The country’s agriculture was
unproductive and continued to be carried out on small, fragmented holdings under the
communal regulation of the old three-field crop rotation system until the agrarian reforms
after 1879. Württemberg industrialized late even by German standards, with factories
first appearing in the 1830s but not becoming widespread until long after 1850. But
Württemberg did have a long history of dense rural crafts and export-oriented protoindustries and in 1800 was accounted to have one of the highest densities of industrial
occupations per capita of any German state (Reininghaus 1990, p. 9). Alongside a general
pattern of by-employed craftsmen-farmers, there were also two regions of much denser
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export-oriented textile proto-industry, the Urach linen region in the east of the country
and the Calw-Wildberg worsted region in the west (Medick 1996; Ogilvie 1997).
The community of Wildberg itself saw the rise of export-oriented worsted
production in the 1580s, and from about 1600 until about 1800 was the most important
single centre of the worsted proto-industry in the country, with 120-140 independent
weavers, comprising some 40 percent of its household heads. The village of Ebhausen
moved into proto-industry much later, with only 25 weavers in 1670 and 50 by 1730, by
which time they comprised about 37 percent of household heads. The worsted protoindustry also offered employment to some 75 percent of the unmarried women and
widows of Wildberg (and later Ebhausen) as piece-rate spinners. But agriculture was also
important in both communities, with about 40 percent of households in Wildberg and 80
percent in Ebhausen at least partly dependent on farming their own land (usually
alongside worsted-weaving or a craft workshop) in 1736. This was reflected in a strongly
“arable” pattern of marriage seasonality in both communities (more accentuated in
Ebhausen than Wildberg), which lasted into the nineteenth century (Ogilvie 1997, ch. 8).
The worsted proto-industry was hard hit in the 1790’s by the French Revolutionary Wars
and in 1797 the monopolistic association of worsted merchants was dissolved. The
economies of Wildberg and Ebhausen gradually reverted to agriculture and locally
oriented crafts and services in the first half of the nineteenth century. Even the
establishment in the later nineteenth century of a few small-scale and short-lived
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“factories” (wool-spinning, heckle-making, saw-milling, oil-milling, fulling, brickmaking) failed fully to re-industrialize the local economy.10
Like many other western European economies, by 1600 Württemberg was quite
market-oriented (Sabean 1990; Ogilvie 1997). Proto-industrial worsted- and linenweavers exported their wares throughout Europe and imported raw materials in bulk from
outside the region. Grain and other foodstuffs were widely sold to provision townspeople,
proto-industrial producers, landless labourers, and the rural land-poor. Labour markets
encompassed servants, day-labourers, spinners, and a whole array of miscellaneous
workers. Land changed hands between kin and non-kin at a rapid rate. On rural credit
markets, borrowers offered mortgages, collateral, and interest-payments to a wide array
of lenders.
On the other hand, in Württemberg all these market transactions were
circumscribed by powerful non-market institutions. We have already mentioned the
Württemberg state, which was strong enough to involve the territory repeatedly in
unnecessary military ventures, but too weak to finance them without granting expensive
monopolies and institutional privileges to rent-seeking interest-groups (Vann 1984;
Ogilvie 1992, 1999). This entrenched the powers of two other institutions – guilds and
local communities – which were much stronger here than, for instance, in the
Netherlands, England, Scotland, or France. Guilds in Württemberg, as in many areas of
central and southern Europe, did not break down after the medieval period but instead
became stronger by securing state enforcement. They regulated rural as well as urban
producers and existed not in just traditional crafts but also in proto-industries,
10

For more detail on the economic history of Wildberg, Ebhausen, and the immediate region, see Ogilvie
(1997, 2003); Troeltsch (1897); Mantel (1974); Klaß (1987); Königliches Statistisch-topographisches
Bureau (1862).
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shopkeeping, merchant trading, and a vast range of other secondary and tertiary
occupations (Hoffmann 1905; Raiser 1978). Worsted textile production in protoindustrial communities such as Wildberg (and later Ebhausen) was regulated by strong
regional weavers’ guilds, which regulated prices, output quotas, techniques, labour
relations, and the prices paid to suppliers such as the army of unguilded female spinners,
and which were not abolished until 1864 (Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2003; Flik 1990). On the
export end, the worsted proto-industry was monopolized by a powerful, guild-like
association of merchant-dyers established in 1650, which until 1797 successfully
enforced its legal right to compel all local weavers to sell exclusively to its members and
excluded all competitors from the worsted trade (Troeltsch 1897; Staudenmeyer 1972;
Ogilvie 1997).
Community institutions in Württemberg also reinforced their control over local
life by offering fiscal and political support to the state in return for enforcement of their
regulations. Each village or town exercised intense surveillance and regulation over
marriage, sexuality, migration, inheritance, citizenship, settlement, agricultural
technology, markets, residence, education, diligence, leisure, and consumption (Grube
1954; Ogilvie 1997; Sabean 1990). Demographic behaviour in particular was closely
monitored and controlled. People were not allowed to marry unless they could satisfy
their community council that they could support themselves, whether by inheriting some
land, achieving guild mastership, or otherwise obtaining a niche in a not very rapidly
growing economy (Sabean 1990; Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2003). Permission to marry and
settle was often denied to men and women who were regarded by their communities as
“economically and morally weak”, according to a set of increasingly formal marriage
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regulations that after 1800 began to be enforced by the state, under the rubric of the
“politische Ehekonsens” (political control of marriage) (Matz 1980; Ehmer 1991;
Guinnane 1996; Ogilvie 1995). This, together with the scarcity of legal “niches” for
achieving economic independence, created incentives for massive emigration from
Württemberg in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to both America and eastern
Europe (Bassler 1974, Hippel 1984). Not until the later nineteenth century did the
economic and demographic regulation exercised by local communal institutions begin to
break down (Sabean 1990). Guilds were not abolished in Württemberg until 1864
(Ogilvie 1997). Marriage restrictions began to liberalize only in 1862 and were abolished
only with German unification in 1870 (Matz 1980; Ehmer 1991).
This was a society, therefore, in which people’s economic and demographic
decisions were affected by both market and non-market factors. On the one hand, hardly
anyone in Württemberg was not exposed to the influences of the market, since few
farmed enough land to subsist from. Nearly everyone had to sell agricultural output, craft
wares, proto-industrial goods, or simply their own labour to survive. This was true for
women as well as men – eighteenth-century Wildberg and Ebhausen show very high
levels of female labour force participation and market orientation, even among married
women (Ogilvie 2003, 2004). For these reasons, every inhabitant of Württemberg from
the seventeenth century on would have experienced the influence of prices in every
decision she or he took.
On the other hand, both economic and demographic decisions were regulated by
powerful non-market “social networks” – guilds and local communities – whose powers
were enforced by the Württemberg state. The state not only exacerbated the vulnerability
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of the population to price fluctuations, whether through war-induced scarcity, monetary
devaluation, high taxation, or forbidding the construction of railways until the 1850s (the
railway reached Wildberg as late as 1870 (Scharf 1995)). It also reinforced the powers of
local communities and guilds, which themselves both constrained and amplified people’s
responses to prices, as well as affecting the underlying formation of these prices. Such
institutionalized social networks had a much more direct effect on economic and
demographic behavior in Württemberg than in England or France, although probably
quite similarly to many economies in central, southern and eastern Europe before the
modern era (Ogilvie 1997, 1999, 2006). This makes it particularly interesting to explore
the operation of Malthusian positive and preventive checks in an institutional
environment more typical of the European continent than the advanced economies of the
north Atlantic seaboard that have been the focus in most existing literature.

3. Births, Deaths, and Marriages
The sources for our demographic data are the parish registers and church
visitation records for the communities of Wildberg and Ebhausen between 1558 and
1870.11 After the Reformation, Württemberg became an officially Lutheran state, which it
remained until 1806 when the Napoleonic territorial reorganization of Germany brought a
number of Catholic territories into the new kingdom. Until then, Württemberg was
religiously homogeneous and (at least outwardly) remarkably pious, aided by the efforts
of a dedicated Lutheran church administration, powerful local church courts (established
1646) which monitored religious observance, and community courts which typically
refused settlement rights to non-Lutherans (while tolerating servants and itinerant
11

For a full discussion of these demographic sources, see Appendix B.
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laborers from Catholic and Calvinist territories) (Ehmer 1999; Fritz 1993; Holtz 1996).
Even after 1806, the Lutheran territories of “Old Württemberg” remained socially distinct
from the kingdom’s new Catholic territories, and the number of non-Lutherans living in
historically Lutheran areas of the country remained tiny. As late as 1895, only 2.4 percent
of the population of Wildberg and 0.5 percent of the population of Ebhausen was nonLutheran. We know this because the numbers of non-Lutherans were carefully
ennumerated in the annual church visitation of each community. Their marriages,
baptisms and burials were also often recorded in the Lutheran parish registers since it was
usually prohibitively difficult for them to travel to a community with a Catholic church.
The annual counts of demographic events that we use in our analysis are extracted
from the baptism, marriage, and burial registers for Wildberg and Ebhausen. The
Württemberg Lutheran church began keeping registers of marriages and baptisms in 1558
and added registers of burials around 1610. But not all communities kept registers
carefully from the beginning or were able to conserve them to the present day. Thus
Wildberg has surviving marriage registers from 1558 on, burials from 1615 on, but
baptisms only from 1646 on because the first register was destroyed in the Thirty Years
War. Ebhausen has marriages inconsistently from 1559 to 1561, but consistently only
from 1604 on, burials from 1571 on, and baptisms from 1559 on.
Although any registration system can be evaded given sufficient motivation,
Württemberg communal institutions and local church courts exercised sufficiently close
surveillance over the inhabitants of the small communities they controlled that the costs
of evasion were very high (Ogilvie 1997; Sabean 1990). There is reason to be confident
that the data extracted from these sources reflect the actual demographic situation.
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Figure 2 presents the populations of these two communities for all years this
measure is available. We plot three series – one each for Wildberg and Ebhausen, and a
third that combines Ebhausen with several nearby sub-parishes of the Ebhausen church.
(These dependent hamlets do not appear in our counts of baptisms, burials, and marriages
for Ebhausen.) Table 1 presents basic information on the annual numbers of demographic
events in the three sub-periods we analyze, whose selection we explain below. These are
all untransformed series, that is, simply the counts of births, deaths, and marriages. Our
estimates all use transformed series, that is, percent deviations from a moving average,
for the reasons discussed below. The series all run through 1914, but start at different
times because of the different dates at which marriage, baptism and burial registers were
kept (or survive) for each community. This implies that in the analysis below the number
of observations for the first sub-period will depend on which demographic variables we
use in the analysis. We have annual grain prices for the entire period.12

4. Econometric Methods
The literature contains several careful studies investigating Malthusian models in
pre-industrial Europe. Lee (1981) pioneered the basic approach, and both Weir (1984)
and Galloway (1988) use nearly identical econometric methods. We focus on Weir’s
study as a comparison, because his approach allows us to see some population responses
we could not if we adopted Galloway’s nearly equivalent approach. Weir and others

12

Both demographic series and price series are for calendar years. Some studies try to match demographic
series to harvest year, but this approach neglects the role of buffer stocks of grain. In any case, one function
of the lags is to pick up any mismatch between the price year and the demographic year.
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convert all variables to percent deviations from an 11-year moving average.13 This
removes any trends from the data, and has the convenient feature that the resulting
regression coefficients are elasticities. These scholars all used very parsimonious models
in which they regressed a demographic series (for example, annual number of births) on
current prices and three lags of prices. Their approaches differed slightly in one respect.
Most models of this type estimated without lags of the dependent variable exhibit serial
correlation. Galloway corrected for serial correlation using a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
Weir used two lagged values of the dependent variable. The two approaches have similar
implications for the estimated price coefficients, but Weir’s allows us to study how
“shocks” to an exogenous variable affected the dependent variable.14

13

Thus the models estimated are similar to an autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) model. We
experimented with simply estimating ARMA models on the untransformed series. Our results were similar
to those reported here, so we focus on the models most easily compared to Weir’s and Galloway’s. The
Durbin-Watson statistic for each regression model discussed below suggests that the model successfully
dealt with the problem of serial correlation. We performed, but do not report, standard tests (the DickeyFuller and Philips-Perron) for unit roots in the series. None of the transformed demographic events series
has a unit root, as one would expect.
14
Galloway (1988, Appendix Table I) reports a fourth lag; this is to conform to Lee’s models. As Weir
notes, the fourth price lag is rarely statistically significant. It was not significant in any of our models. In
our regressions we adjust mortality to reflect primarily non-infant mortality as does Weir (1984, note 26):
Adjusted deaths = Deaths – IMR*(s*Births + (1-s)*Birthst-1) where IMR is the infant mortality rate and s is
a separation factor for the proportion of all infant deaths that occur in the calendar year of birth. We take s
to be .764, as does Weir, and for IMR use the decadal value of the infant mortality rate implied by the first
wave of the Wildberg family reconstitutions. For decades earlier than the 1640s (when the Wildberg family
reconstitution starts) we use .323 as the value of IMR. Our results are not sensitive to the values of s, and,
in fact, results obtained without the mortality adjustment are qualitatively similar to those reported below.
We also estimated the models reported here in a SUR framework. SUR can be, in principle, more efficient
than OLS, but in our models the gains in efficiency were small. We also experimented with Newey-West
standard errors and with approaches that are more robust than OLS against serial correlation and various
forms of conditional heteroscedasticity, but obtained similar results. Here we report and use only the
Huber-White “robust” standard errors. The most common way to interpret a VAR model, using impulseresponse functions (IRF), assumes that all the variables in the system are endogenous. Rye prices here are
not endogenous; neither Wildberg nor Ebhausen was large enough to affect grain markets elsewhere. The
VAR approach is more appropriate for analyzing a country, as in Nicolini (2007). Some recent efforts
estimate Malthusian models using VAR models (for example, Nicolini’s study). A VAR model corresponds
to estimating each equation separately by OLS; the only advantage to the VAR approach is possible gains
in efficiency by estimating the equations in a SUR framework.
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Most earlier research in this literature has used changes in nominal grain prices as
the measure of, or proxy for, economic shocks.15 We follow this practice, and for the
same reasons. There are two ways to think of this approach. First, food costs dominated
household spending until the late nineteenth century in most societies. Thus for most
households short-run changes in grain prices are a good proxy for variations in the real
wage. Second, what we require, formally, is a variable that reflects shifts in the marginal
product of labor, as in Figure 1. Grain prices certainly reflect such shifts in the short run.
We acknowledge, however, that grain price shocks would not affect everyone in a
community in precisely the same way. Some households were either net sellers of grain
or could be at the right relative prices. A net seller of grain would welcome a positive
shock to grain prices. This helps explain some differences between our two communities.
Ideally we would have grain prices for Wildberg and Ebhausen themselves. We
have located nothing like this, and so must use data for other places as proxies for the
“true” local price series. We have, for several cities in southern and western Germany,
reports of the wholesale prices of major grains. The series used here is based on the price
of rye in Augsburg until the early nineteenth century, and the price of rye in Vienna
thereafter. So long as the weather and other shocks faced in these markets are similar to
those in Wildberg and Ebhausen, the series should work well. In addition, as explained in
Appendix A, we can show that prices throughout this region are very strongly correlated,
implying that the series we use would be highly correlated with prices in our
communities. All the prices reported here have been converted to Gulden per hectoliter.

15

Appendix A describes our sources for grain prices, and how we decided which price series to use.

20

5. Mortality, Nuptiality, and Fertility
Given the structure of the models we estimate, the regression results themselves
are not terribly meaningful.16 It is more instructive to use the results to compute a
cumulative elasticity of prices, as in Tables 2-4. The elasticities report a simple thought
experiment: if we increased prices by x percent, what would be the impact on mortality,
nuptiality, and fertility?17 The elasticities cannot be read off the regression model
directly, because of the lagged dependent variables. To see this, consider a specific
example. In 1805, our rye price rose nearly 67 percent over its long-run average price. In
1805, that shock has only a direct effect on, for example, mortality. But in 1806 there are
two price effects: the new price for 1806, a 10 percent increase; and the effect of the 1805
price shock working through the lagged value of the dependent variable. For the same
reason, the standard error of a given elasticity does not correspond to the standard error of
any given regression coefficient.18 Throughout this section, an elasticity is called
“statistically significant” if the 95 percent confidence interval that includes the elasticity
does not include zero. In Tables 2-4, we mark such elasticities with a star (*).
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Appendix Table C.1 presents the full regression results. Appendix Table C.2 reports tests of linear
restrictions that various groups of variables are zero. Our specification choices are constrained by the need
to parallel Weir’s models in order to use his results as a comparison. Many of our individual regressions
have t-statistics that are below conventional confidence levels. This does not necessarily correspond to the
significance of a given elasticity, as shown by the simulations discussed below. For the purposes of our
analysis it is more informative to examine the F-statistic associated with a “block” of variables, such as all
the price effects in a given regression. These statistics imply that the coefficients for the crucial effects,
prices, are generally significant. Note that we would expect the effects in the fertility models to be small or
zero.
17
We cannot improve on Weir’s (1984, p. 38) visual model of these elasticities: suppose the outcome
variable follows a straight-line trend. Imagine the response to the price shock as a deviation from that trend.
The cumulative elasticity represents the area between the (counter-factual) straight-line trend and the
outcome variable as affected by the price shock. The units are in fractions of the value of the outcome
variable in an average year. Thus an elasticity of -.500 implies that over the four-year period, the price
shock reduced total marriages (for example) by an amount equal to half of all marriages that would occur in
an average year.
18
The details of this calculation are in Appendix A.
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We estimate separate models for the periods 1638-1687, 1688-1795, and 17961870.19 The first period is actually somewhat shorter, as the moving-average
transformation of the series loses some years at the start of our data. The periods were
chosen to correspond to major events or changes in the history of the region. In 1688, as
already discussed, French troops invaded Württemberg, causing a noticeable
demographic break, first in mortality and then in nuptiality and fertilty. The second
break-point, 1795, was chosen because of the war with France and the collapse of the
worsted proto-industry, the mainstay of the local economy. The end point of 1870 was
chosen because it was the year that Württemberg joined a unified Germany, the political
controls on permission to marry were abolished, and the railway reached the WildbergEbhausen region; only a few years earlier, in 1864, the Württemberg guilds had been
abolished. We have also examined shorter sub-periods to insure against misspecification
associated with forcing two different regimes into the same model.

Mortality
We begin with mortality. The mortality model has two lagged values of the
dependent variable as well as the current value of prices and three lags of prices. The
Malthusian logic implies that these impacts be positive: an increase in prices should
increase mortality. In the seventeenth century, we find no statistically significant impact
of price shocks on mortality in either of our communities. This apparently perverse
finding can be explained by institutional features – the disastrous warfare into which the
state repeatedly dragged the Württemberg population during the seventeenth century.
Ebhausen was burnt to ashes in the 1630s and Wildberg lost at least one third of its
19

The start-year 1651 is used in all analyses for Wildberg.
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inhabitants. In both communities, a non-trivial share of the population farmed their own
land and thus benefited from higher rye prices. It is therefore not surprising that we
observe no positive check in the seventeenth century: mortality was high, but responded
to warfare and the post-war recovery, not to yearly price fluctuations.
By the early eighteenth century, both communities had recovered
demographically from the Thirty Years War. Agriculture had become less important
again, and proto-industry more important, especially in Ebhausen. It is therefore not
surprising that we find large and often statistically significant effects of price shocks on
mortality in the eighteenth century, in both Wildberg and Ebhausen. In the eighteenth
century, for example, a 10 percent increase in grain prices would raise death rates by
almost 5 percent.
In the period 1795-1870, the relationship between prices and mortality essentially
disappears, as we would expect. With rising incomes and more diversified food supplies,
shocks to any food price should not have the same impact on mortality.
How does the positive check in these Württemberg communities compare to
Weir’s findings for England and France? Weir’s periods do not correspond to ours, so
comparisons cannot be exact. But the comparisons are still instructive. In what Weir calls
the “black” seventeenth century (1670-1739), a grain price shock had a cumulative, fouryear elasticity of .310 in England and.502 in France (Weir 1984, Table 6). By
comparison, Wildberg at .085 was much lower than England, while Ebhausen at .790 was
even larger than France. But neither elasticity for Württemberg is statistically significant.
Evidently the institutional features that drew Württemberg into repeated disastrous wars
and invasions made the seventeenth century even “blacker” in Württemberg than in
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England or France, completely obliterating the expected link between prices and
demographic behavior.20
In Weir’s study, for the period 1790-1829, the parallel figures for England and
France are .424 and .037 (Weir 1984, Table 5). Our results imply that the relationship
between price shocks and mortality essentially disappears in Wildberg and Ebhausen
during the course of the nineteenth century.21
The most interesting comparison arises in the eighteenth century, when we find a
significant positive check in Wildberg and Ebhausen. This is no surprise. But relative to
expectations, the check in our communities is small: we would expect the positive check
to be stronger in our communities than in England or France. After all, England and
France are entire countries (which implies much more room for adjustment to any shock)
and were significantly wealthier and more developed than Württemberg (which would
imply greater resistance to any economic shock). Instead, the positive check in our
communities, at.438 for Wildberg and .488 for Ebhausen, is larger than Weir’s estimate
cumulative four-year elasticity for England (.037) in the period 1790-1829, but about the
same as the alogous figure for France (.424).
Institutional influences can help us explain this apparently surprising finding.
Württemberg communities, as already discussed, exercised very strict controls over who
could live locally. Anyone who did not hold “Bürgerrecht” (citizenship in that
community) was only tolerated on a temporary basis as a “Beisitzer” (a “bye-settler” who
20

On the more more disastrous and institutionally rooted character of the seventeenth-century crisis in
German-speaking central Europe than in England or France, see Ogilvie (1992).
21
For the period 1740-1789, Weir finds that a price shock reduced mortality in both France and England.
This is a perverse result that apparently disappears if weather variables are introduced into the model. Thus
our comparison here is to the next period reports in his Table 5, which is 1790-1829. If we estimate our
models for precisely this period, 1790-1829, we find four-year cumulative elasticities of .292 for Wildberg
and .210 for Ebhausen.
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was obliged to apply annually for permission to go on living in the community). Men
with this status usually carried out the most menial labouring jobs – herding cattle or daylabouring – and could be ejected from the community in hard times (Ogilvie 1997).
Württemberg communities also exercised strict controls over independent unmarried
women, whom they pejoratively called “Eigenbrötlerinnen” – literally “own-breaders” –
and subjected to continual harrassment and threats of expulsion (Ogilvie 1990, 2003).
When an adverse economic shock occurred, the first response of any Württemberg
community was to eject non-citizens, both in order to reduce competition for local
producers and consumers, and to lighten the burden on the communal welfare system
(Ogilvie 1997, 60-72). A vivid illustration of this response to perceived scarcity can be
seen from a case in late seventeenth-century Wildberg. At the annual community
assembly in 1660, at which every man with “citizenship” was asked if he had anything to
report to the rest of the commune, one Wildberg citizen complained that “there are some
Eigenbrötlerinnen here, who should be sent away; in the market everything is grabbed away
by them, and no citizen can get anything any more”. This inspired the community to
conduct “a house-to-house visitation to see what Eigenbrötlerinnen there are here,
whereupon [the matter] shall be ventilated in the community court”.22 In another example,
from 1711, a linen-weaver from Calw who had lived in Wildberg for the preceding 19 years
but was now too old to support himself was sent back to his “citizenship” in Calw.23
Analysis of local court records documents how frequently the communities of Wildberg and
Ebhausen did in practice expel and exclude non-citizens when times got hard or established
22

Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart A573 Bü. 91, fol. 8r-v, 29.10.1660: “Es habe für Aigenbröthlerin. hier solten
thaills abgeschafft werden, werde vff dem Marckht alles von Ihnen hinweg gerissen, könne kein burger
nichts mehr bekommen”; “Nechster tagen solle von hauß zue hauß Visitirt werden, waß sich für
aigbröthlerin alhier befinden alßdan gerichtlich erörtert werd.”
23
Pfarrarchiv Wildberg, Kirchenkonventsprotokolle, Vol. IV, fol. 284v, 25.09.1711.
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citizens perceived outsiders as threatening their economic well-being (Ogilvie 1990, 1997,
2003). This attitude was summed up by the Ebhausen communal church court in 1736 when
it responded to a state inquiry about the adequacy of its welfare system by reporting that “if
no more outsiders come in, then we are indeed in a position to provide for our own poor”.24
An institutional environment with these characteristics might indeed give rise to a
situation in which the mortality response to an adverse price shock, despite
Württemberg’s comparative poverty and underdevelopment, could be milder than in
England or France. Admittedly, a small number of marginal non-citizens might be more
likely to die – but as vagrants they would tend to die without being recorded or would
survive by migrating to less hard-hit localities.25 And as a result of their ejection, the
established community citizens left behind would have fewer hungry mouths to feed
(whether through their own earnings or through the communal welfare system) and
would weather the price shock with lower mortality. By shifting the mortality impact of a
price shock onto a small group of already impoverished migrants, the Württemberg
institutional regime might well have weakened the positive check among the majority
population of established locals. Württemberg communities, that is, could export part of
the effect of an economic shock.26
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Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen, Kirchenkonventsprotokolle, Vol. III, fol. 198r, 6.8.1736: “wann Keine frembde
mehr kommen, sind wir schon im stand unsere eigene arme zu versorg. ”.
25
A few deaths of vagrants are recorded in the Wildberg and Ebhausen burial registers, but the literature
concludes that most such people slipped through the registration system. Those ejected by small
communities typically ended up in larger urban centres where they could more easily escape surveillance
and avoid ejection. On this, see, e.g. Jütte (1994).
26
Hammel and Galloway (2000) study the positive check in the northern Balkans at the end of the
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. The econometric approach they use is similar to
that in Galloway (1988). This is one of the few such studies of the positive check, to our knowledge, that
links the positive check and changes in its magnitude to detailed historical and institutional conditions.
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Nuptiality
Our models for nuptiality include two lagged values of the dependent variable as
well as mortality and three lags of mortality and the same price variables as in the
mortality model. The elasticities of nuptiality with respect to price shocks are reported in
Table 3. The Malthusian model predicts that an increase in prices will reduce nuptiality,
which is confirmed in our models for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Eighteenth-century Wildberg had an especially powerful preventive check: a ten percent
increase in grain prices reduces marriages by nearly 7 percent after four years.
Weir’s basic finding was that Wrigley and Schofield had mischaracterized the
relative power of the preventive check in England and France. Weir found that it was,
contrary to their view, stronger in France. The preventive check was even stronger in
eighteenth-century Württemberg, as Figure 3 reports. This comparison selects the Weir
sub-period in which the preventive check was apparently strongest. The preventive check
was even stronger in Wildberg in the eighteenth century. The preventive check in
Ebhausen was not nearly so strong in the eighteenth century – perhaps because the village
was still quite small and niches remained available in proto-industrial worsted-weaving
there up to about 1730 (Ogilvie 1997, pp. 131-9). But the preventive check in eighteenthcentury Ebhausen was still stronger than in England in the period 1740-1789, and nearly
as strong as in France. The preventive check loses much of its force in our communities
during the nineteenth century, although in Wildberg the values remain about the same as
in England in the same period.27
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This comparisons are sharper if we use Weir’s shorter periods. For the period 1740-1789, for example,
the four-year cumulative elasticity of prices with respect to marriages in Wildberg is -.782. For France in
the same period, Weir estimates an elasticity of -.608, and for England, -.113. The comparable figure for
Ebhausen is -.204.
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The exceptional strength of the preventive check in Wildberg, and to a lesser
extent in Ebhausen, runs against some widely held views, according to which the
Western European Marriage Pattern was particularly strongly rooted in the northwest
corner of Europe (England, the Low Countries, and northern France).28 It also casts light
on the underlying causes of this marriage pattern, some of which consisted of informal
cultural expectations while others consisted of formal institutional rules. Traditionally,
the Western European pattern of late marriage and high lifetime celibacy is regarded as
having been primarily cultural in origin, driven by the informal expectation that one did
not marry unless one could support oneself independently, but not enforced by much (or
any) formal institutional coercion. This informal cultural expectation also prevailed in
Württemberg, but was intensified, as discussed above, by a system of formal institutional
rules enforced by community councils, church courts, and guilds, which regulated
permission to settle, marry, form an independent household, and practise an occupation
independently, and did so in the perceived interest of established male citizens. Over the
course of the eighteenth century, these traditional institutional practices were increasingly
backed up by state regulations formalizing communal control over marriage and
settlement, and imposing additional restrictions on the marriage of certain sub-groups
such as paupers and soldiers. By the early nineteenth century this had turned into the
notorious “politische Ehekonsens”, a draconian system of demographic regulation
practised by states in alliance with local communities across broad swathes of central
Europe until c. 1870 (Guinnane 1996; Ogilvie 1995; Matz 1980; Ehmer 1991).
The human cost was high: by 1800, 22 per cent of Wildberg women were lifetime
celibates, emigration rates were high, and illegitimate births were proliferating, bringing
28

Hajnal (1965, 1982); Macfarlane (1978); Laslett (1988); De Moor and Van Zanden (2005).
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in their wake very high levels of infant mortality by European standards. The women
who failed to marry were forbidden by communities and guilds to engage in many
independent economic occupations. Excluded from guilded crafts, commerce, and most
services (other than prostitution), they were pushed into spinning (at piece-rates set at
artificially low levels by weaving guilds) and day-labouring (at wages fixed by male
community councils), and most eked out a wretched living on the margins of
Württemberg’s corporate communities (Ogilvie 2003; 2004). But this institutionally
enforced Central European variant of the Western European Marriage Pattern evidently
gave rise to extremely strong preventive checks, and thus a population whose nuptiality
and fertility reacted very sensitively – perhaps even over-reacted – to fluctuations in
prices.
Why did the strong negative effect of prices on nuptiality weaken in the
nineteenth century, when the “political control of marriages” is supposed to have been
most intense? The institutional framework may offer an explanation for this finding.
Communal controls on citizenship, settlement, marriage and work, combined with guild
controls on occupational mobility, combined to cause huge emigration from Württemberg
to North America and eastern Europe, which reached its highpoint in the nineteenth
century (Hippel 1984). An adverse economic shock was likely to cause a surge in
emigration by the economically weak, leaving behind the economically strong. Until the
liberalization and ultimate abolition of the Württemberg political controls on permission
to marry (which did not occur until 1862-1870), the economically weak members of
communities were precisely those most likely to be denied permission to marry (Matz
1980; Ehmer 1991; Ogilvie 2003). An adverse economic shock in the high-emigration

29

environment of the nineteenth century was likely, therefore, to cause the non-marrying
poor to emigrate, leaving more niches to encourage marriages among the middling and
better-off members of the community. The weakening of the impact of prices on
nuptiality in the nineteenth century may therefore – paradoxically – be an artefact of the
strengthening of the institutional restrictions on marriage which encouraged emigration
among those strata most likely to be hard hit by a price shock.

Mortality and Nuptiality
To consider another feature of the institutional environment in Wildberg and
Ebhausen, we must briefly step away from the pure Malthusian model. Weir and others in
this literature control, in their nuptiality models, for the effect of mortality. The idea is
that a mortality spike might affect marriages in the near future by reducing the number of
possible mates available, or by creating a larger number of widows and widowers seeking
to remarry. The direct effect of mortality on nuptiality has not, however, received much
attention in interpreting these models. Figure 4 shows the simulated impact of a mortality
shock on nuptiality for Wildberg and the similar period from Weir’s estimates for France
and England. (The figure reports elasticities for Wildberg only; similar computations for
Ebhausen show that the effect there is similar but smaller than in Wildberg). These
hypothetical shocks to mortality hold prices constant, so they are somewhat artificial.
Most events that would lead to mortality shocks, such as war or crop failure, would also
affect prices. The elasticities are much, much larger than the price elasticities. They imply
for the eighteenth century that a ten percent increase in the death rate in Wildberg would
cause an eight percent total increase in marriages over a four-year period. The ninety-five
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percent confidence interval for the Wildberg elasticities (not reported) lie above the
French estimate after the first year; we cannot compute the error bands for Weir’s
elasticities because we lack the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, but the
Wildberg elasticities are clearly much larger than those in France or Enland in this
period.
This result is fully consistent with the institutional framework governing family
formation and economic activity in rural Württemberg. Marriage was only possible if one
could both support oneself and convince one’s community council and one’s guild that
one could do so. This required inheriting some land (implying that someone had to die)
and, since only a few people still lived exclusively from farming their own land, also
inheriting a craft workshop from one’s father or the capital to set up a new workshop.
Furthermore, one had to persuade the local guild chapter that regulated one’s craft or
other occupation that an additional workshop would not constitute “unfair” competition
against existing masters, as can be seen from communal court minutes and petitions of
those refused permission to marry or settle locally on precisely such grounds. One young
man who in the seventeenth century promised marriage to an Ebhausen girl, “on condition
that if he be admitted here as a [community] citizen he will get wedded to her”, was
“rejected by the bailiff and community court [on the grounds that] the craft is over-filled and
the citizenry altogether too large”.29

Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart A573 Bü. 124, fol. 61r, 23.4.1625: “solch. mas. verheürath, dz wann er,
bürg.lich alhie einkomme, er hochzeit mit ihro hallten wölle”; “werde er vonn s: vnnd gericht abgewis., daß
handtwerkh seye übersezt vnd die burgerschafft allzugroß”. Schofield (2003, p. 57) contrasts the English
demographic system, “which operated through the mechanisms of the wage-economy,” to an economy
based on the filling of niches, “in which people have to wait for dead men’s shoes before they can enter
upon a holding.”
29
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This left day-laboring as the main occupation not reliant on inheriting or obtaining
guild mastership or both. But community councils were chary of permitting marriage to
people who could only support themselves through day-laboring (Matz 1980; Ogilvie
1997, 2003). Although it was sometimes inevitable, communities sought to restrain the
practice, and the central state increasingly provided them with legislative instruments to
help them enforce these marriage restrictions against poor people. Thus, for instance, in
1743 the Ebhausen church court refused permission to Jerg Rauschenberger from
Monhardt (an isolated hamlet near Ebhausen) to marry the daughter of an Ebhausen
citizen, on the grounds that “all circumstances show absolutely clearly that both Godly
commandments and temporal ordinances permit no marriage here ... Rauschenberger is
not a community citizen and neither can nor will be accepted as such, and the latest
instructions from the district authorities relating to the many princely decrees and to the
princely marriage ordinance totally prohibit recognition of such marriages any longer,
and on both sides [bride’s and groom’s] there is nothing present but pure poverty”.30
Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising that marriage in Württemberg emerges as
being so strongly dependent on mortality, which alone could free up “niches” and create
incentives for one’s community to permit a new household to be formed.

Fertility
Finally, we turn to the estimates of how fertility responded to price shocks. The
models reported here can be thought of as either tests of the key assumption underlying
Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen, Kirchenkonventsprotokolle, Vol. IV, fol. 10v, 26.4.1743: “da nun alle umbstand
so clar u: deütl:, daß das gottl.: gepoten, u: die weltl: ordnung hierin keine Ehe Erlaubt, dazu noch
gekomm., daß .... d. rausch.berger kein burger, auch zu keinen burger könn. noch woll. angenomm. werd.,
u: das lestere oberammtl.: außschreiben welches sich auff frstl.: vile Rescript, u: Eheordnung. beziehet,
durchauß v.bietet keine solche Ehen Mehr zu erkenn., u: beederseits eine pure armuth Vorhand.”.
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Malthusian models – that fertility is regulated by marriage, not by fertility decisions
within marriage – or as a crude effort to look for the beginnings of the fertility transition.
At a simple level, the fertility of a natural fertility population should not react to price
shocks. One can think of qualifications, of course. In a badly-nourished population, a
severe shock might be enough to reduce the fecundability of women, and thus reduce
fertility without any intentional fertility control. That is, the price shocks modeled here
might affect the determinants of natural fertility as well as provide incentives to control
fertility.31
The fertility models again include two lagged values of the dependent variable,
the usual price variables, and the current and three lagged values of mortality. One would
expect fertility in such a population to be a function of nuptiality, but recent marriages
will account for a small fraction of all fertile couples. In any case, adding nuptiality terms
to the model does not alter the results presented here.
Table 4 reports the elasticities of fertility with respect to rye prices. On the one
hand, the estimates for the periods up to 1795 confirm the basic assumptions of the
Malthusian model: fertility does not respond significantly to price shocks in most cases.32
The regulation of births works through the regulation of marriage. The nineteenth century
31

The next step in our research is to use family reconstitutions for Wildberg, Ebhausen, and a third village,
Auingen, to examine the determinants of fertility. Thus we are not relying on this exercise to examine the
fertility transition per se. For the purposes of the present analysis, we prefer to remain agnostic on the
precise interpretation of the reaction of marital fertility, measured this way, to price shocks. A recent paper
using couple-level data from Sweden for the period 1766-1864 interprets the reaction of fertility to price
shocks as deliberate contraception (Bengtsson and Dribe (2006)). We are sympathetic to that view, and
plan to pursue a similar analysis with our family-reconstitution data. An alternative interpretation would be
that the response of marital fertility to price shocks reflects variations in the level of natural fertility. Such
variations might reflect the impact of prices on nutrition, spousal separation, or coital frequency. The latter
interpretation is plausible but debated. Among others, Menken, Trussell, and Watkins (1981) doubt that
plausible nutritional changes could affect the biological determinants of fecundity enough to produce
significant changes in fertility.
32
The fertility series here is constructed from legitimate births, as it should be for our argument. Reestimating these models including illegitimate births shows that extra-marital fertility behaved in a very
similar way.

33

holds some surprises that will provide the basis for our future work based on the familyreconstitution data for these communities. Wildberg fertility exhibits significant, negative
responses to a price shock for the period 1796-1870. To place these in context, the largest
such elasticities Weir reports, for England and France in the period 1790-1829, range up
to -.208. For France in the period 1830-1869, when we know from other sources that a
fertility transition was well underway, Weir’s largest estimates are -.122 (Weir 1984,
Table 4). So the fertility responses we find for Wildberg are relatively strong. Wildberg
thus shows some evidence of possible fertility control in the period 1795-1870, before the
demographic transition is supposed to have taken off in Germany. These econometric
findings are very suggestive, but this kind of aggregative analysis is not sufficient to
demonstrate that fertility control was really taking place. We will address this issue in
greater detail with the family reconstitution approach, which supports fine-grained tests
of departures from natural fertility.

How Did Wildberg and Ebhausen Differ?
Overall, Wildberg and Ebhausen responded to price shocks very similarly, but
occasionally their reactions diverged. Why might this have been? Formal econometric
testing suggests that in some instances where the Wildberg and Ebhausen models appear
to diverge, it is really just a matter of imprecise estimates for one or the other community;
that is, we usually cannot reject the null hypothesis of “no model difference” for the two
places. In other cases, the divergence is explicable in terms of economic differences
between the two communities – Wildberg was more urban, more industrial, more
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wealthy, and more economically stagnant; Ebhausen was more rural, more agricultural,
poorer, and began its proto-industrial expansion nearly a century later.
There are no instances in which the positive check is significant in one
community and not in the other. The elasticities also tend to have similar magnitudes for
the communities. The only exception is the seventeenth century, when the positive check
in Ebhausen is somewhat erratic, but much larger than in Wildberg (although not
statistically significant). Wildberg had a far more industrial economy and Ebhausen a far
more agricultural one. As late as 1736, despite the continual growth of proto-industry in
Ebhausen, around 80 percent of its households lived partly from farming their own land,
compared to only 40 percent of households in Wildberg. There are two, offsetting effects
at work here. On the one hand, one would expect the more highly industrialized
community of Wildberg to have been more vulnerable to a price shock because it
contained more households that were net purchasers of food, and hence to show a
stronger positive check than the more agricultural community of Ebhausen where more
households benefited from rising grain prices by being net sellers, rather than buyers, of
grain. On the other hand, Wildberg’s income base was more diversified, and this case the
benefits of diversification prevailed. The positive check converges in the two
communities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not surprisingly since Ebhausen
was becoming more highly industrial, and hence more similar to Wildberg
Nuptiality also responds somewhat differently in the two communities. In the
seventeenth century, the preventive check is stronger in Ebhausen, although not
significant. In the eighteenth century it is much stronger in Wildberg, and this time
statistically significant. In the third period (1796-1870), the elasticities are essentially the
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same between Wildberg and Ebhausen, and very small. Wildberg nuptiality remained
more vulnerable to shocks in the eighteenth century. This is not surprising, since its
economy was still more industrial than that of Ebhausen.
Fertility responds in a basically similar way in both communities. In the first and
second periods, the signs are always the same between the two communities, the
magnitudes are always very similar (and very small). In the third period, Wildberg shows
signs of limiting fertility in the face of price shocks. Ebhausen’s response is slightly
smaller in absolute value and shows the same sign, so there is no contradiction between
the results for the two communities, except for the fact that highly urban and longindustrialized Wildberg may be showing some early signs of fertility control in the 75
years before 1870, whereas more rural and still more agricultural Ebhausen was not.

6. Conclusions
This paper uses a now-standard methodology to model the impact of short-run
fluctuations in prices on mortality, nuptiality, and fertility in two Württemberg
communities from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century. We confirm, as have
many before us, the existence of a positive check and a preventive check in the eighteenth
century. We also confirm the basic assumption of the Malthusian model of fertility: births
are largely regulated by variables affecting marriage rates rather than by the limitation of
fertility within marriage. At one level, therefore, our study provides one more
confirmation of the basic contours of this Malthusian model.
But in many ways our results differ from those found for other European regions,
and in ways that signal the need to pay close attention to the way local institutions

36

governed economic life. Unfortunately most studies of this sort have not paid much
attention to the institutional context or have only remarked on institutions to explain
some uncomfortable finding. We know that in this part of Germany, local communities,
occupational guilds, and the state had unusually well-developed powers over the right to
marry, to carry on an occupation, and even to live in a given place. Those powers imply
specific departures from the findings for England or France in the same periods. Our
analysis confirms the demographic importance of these institutional features of the
Württemberg environment, and form a warning to those who would ignore them in other
contexts.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Untransformed Demographic Events Series
Wildberg:
Baptisms
(excluding
stillbirths)

1651-1687*
52
85
35

1688-1795
55.8
72
36

1796-1870
61.8
99
41

Marriages

12.8
19
7

12.7
24
4

17.5
34
6

Burials
excluding
stillbirths and
peri-natal
deaths

41.7
86
17

51
185
13

60.1
117
39

Ebhausen:
Baptisms
(excluding
stillbirths)

1634-1687
14.1
28
0

1688-1795
23.1
64
1

1796-1870
55.8
84
31

Marriages

3.2
12
0

32.2
60
8

14.6
27
3

Burials
excluding
stillbirths and
peri-natal
deaths

6.7
24
0

6.8
19
0

42.7
72
17

Note: Figures are the mean, maximum, and minimum of the untransformed annual series.
These are not crude rates. First period for Wildberg is actually 1651-1688
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Table 2: Cumulative Elasticities of Mortality with Respect to a Price Shock
1634-1688
Years
since
shock
0
1
2
3
4

Wildberg
-0.346
0.136
0.316
0.092
0.085

Ebhsen
-0.679
0.553
-0.008
0.657
0.790

1689-1795

Wildberg
0.124
*0.550
*0.980
0.450
0.438

Ebhsen
-0.087
*0.578
*0.686
0.443
0.488

1796-1870

Wildberg
0.008
0.074
-0.029
0.163
0.169

Ebhsen
-0.020
-0.008
-0.054
0.074
0.060

Source: computed from the regression models; full regression results are available on
request.
Note: * means that a 95-percent confidence interval for this statistic does not include
zero. First period for Wildberg is 1651-1688
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Table 3: Cumulative Elasticities of Nuptiality with Respect to a Price Shock
1634-1688
Years
since
shock
0
1
2
3
4

Wildberg
-0.080
-0.220
-0.034
-0.141
-0.178

Ebhausen
0.402
-0.825
0.825
0.083
-0.201

1689-1795

Wildberg
-0.071
*-0.447
*-0.574
*-0.750
*-0.699

Ebhausen
-0.322
-0.117
0.077
-0.203
-0.230

1796-1870

Wildberg
-0.012
0.036
-0.043
0.136
0.132

Ebhausen
0.215
-0.187
-0.099
0.000
-0.003

Source: Computed from the regression models; full regression results are available on
request.
Notes:
These elasticities are net of mortality.
First period for Wildberg is 1651-1688
* means that a 95-percent confidence interval for this statistic does not include
zero.
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Table 4: Cumulative Elasticities of Fertility with Respect to a Price Shock
Years
since
shock

1634-1688

0
1
2
3
4

Wildberg
0.051
*-0.232
-0.007
-0.153
-0.068

Ebhausen
-0.108
-0.086
0.002
-0.219
-0.171

1689-1795
Wildberg
0.020
-0.027
-0.096
-0.066
-0.056

Ebhausen
-0.072
-0.036
-0.096
-0.115
-0.099

1796-1870
Wildberg
-0.006
*-0.142
*-0.123
*-0.165
*-0.165

Ebhausen
0.104
-0.078
-0.124
-0.051
-0.061

Source: Computed from the regression models; full regression results are available on
request.
Notes:
These elasticities are net of mortality.
The first period for Wildberg is 1651-1688
* means that a 95-percent confidence interval for this statistic does not include
zero.
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Figure 1: A Schematic Representation of the Malthusian Model
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Figure 2: Populations of Wildberg and Ebhausen
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Figure 3: Comparisons of the Sensitivity of Nuptiality to Price Shocks
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Figure 4: The Impact of Mortality Shocks on Nuptiality
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Appendix A: Explanation of Standard Errors and Construction of Price Series
Estimation of Standard Errors
The standard errors of the elasticities discussed in the text cannot be read directly
off the regression results. We constructed the standard errors by bootstrap, as follows. We
created 1000 replications of a normally distributed random variable with mean β* and
variance-covariance matrix VC(β*), where β* is the vector of estimated OLS coefficients
and VC(β*) is their estimated variance-covariance matrix. We then constructed our
elasticity statistics ε algebraically from these 1000 replications. The 95 percent
confidence intervals were constructed by finding the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of these
ε’s. We used the Huber-White variance-covariance matrix that underlies the t-statistics
reported in Appendix Table C.1. We experimented with the Newey-West variancecovariance matrix, which is in principle robust against serial correlation. These did not
affect the significance levels reported in Tables 3-4.
Price Series Used in Estimation
There are two specific limitations to our price data. First, none deals with a
market in the region of Wildberg and Ebhausen. Appendix Table A.1 lists the various
grain price series we were able to locate, and additional details for the series we actually
use. The series from an area closest to Wildberg and Ebhausen is the series we are calling
“Württemberg” (which is claimed to be for the entire country, although the author is not
clear about his sources). The others are for cities at some distance. Distance per se is not
a huge problem. First, most price shocks reflect supply shocks that were in turn caused by
weather. To the extent Frankfurt and the Wildberg-Ebhausen region share similar weather
patterns, the price information from Frankfurt should be closely correlated with that from
Wildberg. Second, in the pre-railroad age (i.e. in the Wildberg-Ebhausen region up to
1870), access to water routes made some distances economically shorter than others.
Shiue (2005) has shown for the nineteenth century that cities on the same river are
economically much closer to one another than those on different rivers. If this is true in
our period then Ausgburg is much further away than is Frankfurt or even Cologne,
because the river of the Wildberg-Ebhausen region (the Nagold) drains to the Rhine. A
more serious problem is that prices generated by a large market such as Frankfurt may
not reflect the full range of price shocks experienced by people in the Wildberg-Ebhausen
region; in a well-functioning market, price shocks are profit opportunities that are
arbitraged away.
One way to address this concern is to ask how closely the various grain-price
series are correlated with each other. This does not tell us, really, whether our
hypothetical price series for the Wildberg-Ebhausen region would be correlated with
Frankfurt, but if Frankfurt and Augsburg are correlated with each other, then it gives us
greater confidence that the variations in prices are not driven by idiosyncratic shocks.
Focusing for the moment on rye prices (for which our series are most complete, and
which was the basic bread-grain in most parts of pre-industrial Germany) we find
extremely high correlations across markets. The Württemberg price series has a zeroorder correlation of at least .55 with all other rye prices, in the years for which the series
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overlap. Its correlation with the series we use most in this version of the analysis (rye in
Augsburg) is about .82. To take a more focused case, for the 5 price series we could use
in the analysis of the sub-period 1646-1805, the period when we have the greatest
heterogeneity in location and grain for the price data, the lowest pairwise correlation is
.67.
All of the results presented in the text use a single series derived from two
underlying sources. Prior to 1821, it is the price of rye in Augsburg; after this date, it is
the price of rye in Vienna. The Augsburg series have a few missing values which are
interpolated using the predicted values from an AR(3) model. Both series are expressed
as gulden per hectoliter. Given the correlations noted above, we are confident that this
series is up to the task at hand. But for additional confidence we undertook two types of
robustness checks. For individual sub-periods we sometimes have several choices of
price series. Where possible, we re-estimated our models using alternative price series. In
none of the cases can we identify significantly different results associated with a different
series. More systematically, we also used principal-component methods to combine
series, then using the first principal component instead of a single price series. Again, this
approach yields answers that are substantially the same as those reported in the text.
Our ongoing research project on Württemberg household inventories
(http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/ogilvie/ESRC-project-English.pdf) promises to yield
local price series for grain stocks as well as many other items of daily consumption. A
previous analysis by Maisch (1992) (Table 3.1.3.1.c) reports prices for spelt (a variety of
wheat) extracted from personal inventories in three Württemberg villages quite close to
our project communities, in 25 selected years 1712-1808. Our calculations show that
Maisch’s grain prices from inventories are strongly and significantly correlated across the
three villages (lowest pairwise correlation 0.76) and with Augsburg market prices from
Elsas (1936) (lowest correlation 0.67). This strong correlation in grain prices among these
Württemberg villages, and between these Württemberg villages and market prices
recorded elsewhere, provides reassuring support for our use of German price series from
outside the immediate proximity of our project communities.
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Appendix Table A.1: Grain Price Series

City/Place
Frankfurt am
Main

Crop
Roggen

Years

Source
Elsas M. J., 1940. Umriss einer Geschichte der
Preise und Lohne in Deutschland, Vol. 2A, pp.
464-511.

1550-1820

Elsas, M. J., 1936. Umriss einer Geschichte der
Preise und Lohne in Deutschland, Vol 1, pp. 593599.

1550-1628,
1766-1895

1550-1628: Helferich, J. A. R. von, 1858.
“Württembergische Getreide- und Weinpreise von
1456-1628. Ein Betrag zur Geschichte der
Geldentwerthung nach der Entdeckung von
Amerika,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Staatswissenschaft, 14(2/3): 471-502.

Hafer
Augsburg

Weizen
Roggen
Hafer

Württemberg

Gerste
Kernen

1766-1895: Königliches Statistisches Landesamt,
1896. “Die Durchschnittspreise von Getreide
(Kernen, Gerste, Haber, Dinkel, Weizen, Roggen)
in Württemberg in den Jahren 1766-1895,”
Württembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik und
Landeskunde, 1896(II): 117-122.
Gerste
Hafer
Dinkel
Weizen
Roggen
Speyer

Mainz

Roggen
Gerste
Hafer
Roggen
Hafer
Weizen
Korn

Vienna

Korn

Würzburg

1766-1895
1830, 18521895
1766-1895
1550-1820
1550-1799
1550-1799
1730-1789

1691-1913

Königliches Statistisches Landesamt, 1896. “ Die
Durchschnittspreise von Getreide (Kernen,
Gerste, Haber, Dinkel, Weizen, Roggen) in
Württemberg in den Jahren 1766-1895,”
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Appendix B: Provenance of Demographic Data
The number of deaths in each year is extracted from the burial registers, which
record the date and personal details of each individual buried in Wildberg from 1615
onward and in Ebhausen from 1571 onward.33 Since the registers record even the deaths
of itinerant journeymen, soldiers, Calvinists, and Catholics, there is strong reason to
believe that it is an accurate record of local mortality.
The number of marriages in each year is extracted from the marriage registers,
which record the date and personal details of all brides and grooms married in Wildberg
from 1558 on, and for Ebhausen inconsistently from 1559 to 1561 and consistently from
1604 on.34 As discussed in the main text, marriage in Württemberg was closely regulated
by local community institutions as well as local church courts, and thus it is highly
unlikely that any couple was permitted to live in the married state without having their
married state officially recorded.35 When bride and groom were from different
communities, they had the choice of which community to marry in, and this might have
led to the registering of some marriages in Wildberg for couples who did not intend to
settle there and vice versa. This might have meant that they were responding to the
economic and demographic constraints prevailing in some neighbouring community
rather than Wildberg. However, there was an incentive to celebrate one’s marriage in the
community where one intended to settle, as a way of establishing oneself within the
social networks of the local community.36 Furthermore, as long as social practices
regarding where marriages were celebrated did not change significantly over time (and
there is no evidence they did), the minor degree of over- or under-registration of
weddings of couples of mixed community origin should not bias the number of marriages
recorded in Wildberg from year to year.37
The number of births in each year is extracted from the baptism registers, which
record the date and personal details of all infants born, along with information about their
parents, for Wildberg from 1646 on and for Ebhausen from 1558 on.38 The baptism
33

Wildberg burials are registered in Pfarrarchiv Wildberg, Kirchenbücher, Bd. 6 (Toten 1615-1670), Bd.
11 (Toten 1671-1771), Bd. 12 (Toten 1772-1807), Bd. 13 (Toten 1808-1832), Bd. 14 (Toten 1832-1854),
Bd. 15 (Toten 1855-1888) ; Bd. 23 (1889-1942). Ebhausen burials are registered in Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen
(microfilms in Landeskirchliches Archiv Stuttgart), Bd. 1 (Toten 1571-1674), Bd. 3 (Toten 1674-1740),
Bd. 4 (Toten 1740-1807), Bd. 13 (Toten 1808-1846), Bd. 14 (Toten 1847-1875); unnumbered volume
(1876-1914).
34
Wildberg marriages are registered in Pfarrarchiv Wildberg, Kirchenbücher, Bd. 6 (Ehen 1558-1745), Bd.
7 (Ehen 1739-1808), Bd. 8 (Ehen 1808-1845), Bd. 9 (Ehen 1846-1872), Bd. 10 (Ehen 1873-1968).
Ebhausen marriages are registered in Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen (microfilms in Landeskirchliches Archiv
Stuttgart), Bd. 1 (Ehen 1559-1561, 1604-1674), Bd. 3 (Ehen 1674-1740), Bd. 4 (Ehen 1740-1807), Bd. 11
(Ehen 1808-1846), Bd. 12 (Ehen 1847-1898) ; unnumbered volume (1899-1914).
35
For examples of these sorts of controls of vital registration in action in early modern Ebhausen and
Wildberg, see Ogilvie (2003), esp. ch. 2.
36
As shown by the fact that significantly fewer men than women married into Wildberg from outside; on
this see Mantel (1974), p. 144 (Table A4).
37
On figures for marriages into and out of Wildberg from 1559 to 1750, see Mantel (1974), esp. Table A4.
38
Wildberg baptisms are registered in Pfarrarchiv Wildberg, Kirchenbücher, Bd. 1 (Taufen 1646-1771),
Bd. 2 (Taufen 1772-1807), Bd. 3 (Taufen 1808-1829), Bd. 4 (Taufen 1830-1854), Bd. 5 (Taufen 18551884); Bd. 9 (Taufen 1885-1926). Ebhausen baptisms are registered in Pfarrarchiv Ebhausen (microfilms in
Landeskirchliches Archiv Stuttgart), Bd. 1 (Taufen 1559-1674), Bd. 2 (Taufen 1871-1875), Bd. 3 (Taufen
1674-1740), Bd. 4 (Taufen 1740-1792), Bd. 5 (Taufen 1793-1807), Bd. 6 (Taufen 1808-1836), Bd. 7
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registers record the dates and place of both birth and baptism (seldom more than a few
days apart before the nineteenth century), and even include the baptisms of children born
non-Lutheran parents, especially around 1870 when Wildberg hosted a large temporary
population of Catholic railway workers. The only local births that may be missing are
those of Catholic couples who incurred the costs of traveling to a community with a
Catholic church in order to baptise their children; but since there was seldom more than a
single Catholic household in Wildberg at any date during the period under analysis, it is
unlikely that this had any significant effect on our figures. The baptism registers record
illegitimate births carefully, since illegitimacy was a matter of deep concern to both
church (for moral reasons) and community (for economic reasons) and midwives were
obliged to swear an oath to report all births (Ogilvie 1986, 2003). These facts suggest
strongly that the baptisms registers contain an accurate record of local fertility.
The population counts we use are extracted from the reports on the periodic
inspections (“visitations”) of the Wildberg and Ebhausen parish churches, which took
place periodically from 1584 onward and close to annually between 1653 and 1821. After
1822, these were replaced by population counts undertaken by the state authorities every
3-9 years.39

(Taufen 1837-1870), Bd. 8 (Taufen 1871-1897), Bd. 9 (Taufen 1842-1852), Bd. 10 (Taufen 1857-1871);
unnumbered volume (1872-1914).
39
The archival sources for the population counts are: Landeskirchliches Archiv Stuttgart,
Synodusprotokolle (1584-1822); Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, A 281 Kirchenvisitationsakten (1563, 1599,
1601-1806); Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg E 258 III Nr. 7699, Oberamt Nagold (1834-1917); Staatsarchiv
Ludwigsburg E 258 III Nr. 98, Oberamt Calw (Ebhausen) (1834-1917). Population counts for our
communities were also extracted from the following published sources: Königl. StatistischTopographischen Bureau, ed., Königlich-Württembergisches Hof- und Staats-Handbuch. Stuttgart (counts
for 1821, 1824, 1828, 1831, 1835); Philipp Wilhelm Gottlieb Hausleutner, Schwäbisches Archiv. Stuttgart,
1790 (counts for 1622, 1634, 1639, 1645 (communicant and catechist numbers only); Königl. statist.topograph. Bureau, ed. [author: Eduard Paulus], Beschreibung des Oberamts Nagold: mit drei Tabellen,
einer Karte des Oberamts und drei Ansichten, Stuttgart, 1862, pp. 150, 252.
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Appendix Table C.1: Regression results
Wildberg nuptiality

L. Marriages
L2. Marriages
Deaths
L. Deaths
L2. Deaths
L3. Deaths
Rye prices
L. Rye prices
L2. Rye prices
L3. Rye prices
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1651-1688
0.189
(1.07)
-0.090
(0.61)
-0.038
(0.30)
-0.146
(1.68)
-0.099
(1.02)
0.090
(0.94)
-0.080
(0.36)
-0.126
(0.58)
0.206
(1.12)
-0.155
(1.23)
0.352
(0.09)
38
0.32

(2)
1689-1795
-0.135
(1.34)
-0.213
(2.11)*
0.267
(3.68)**
0.350
(5.06)**
0.222
(3.12)**
0.177
(2.90)**
-0.071
(0.65)
-0.386
(3.34)**
-0.193
(1.35)
-0.273
(2.37)*
-1.474
(0.55)
107
0.36

(3)
1796-1870
-0.074
(0.68)
-0.115
(1.12)
-0.169
(1.60)
-0.174
(1.73)
-0.284
(1.90)
-0.263
(2.38)*
-0.012
(0.10)
0.047
(0.35)
-0.077
(0.49)
0.179
(1.43)
-0.089
(0.03)
75
0.17

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Ebhausen nuptiality

L. Marriages
L2. Marriages
Deaths
L.
L2.
L3.
Rye prices
L. Rye prices
L2. Rye prices
L3. Rye prices
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1634-1688
-0.201
(1.41)
-0.263
(1.34)
0.070
(0.72)
0.026
(0.27)
0.069
(1.15)
0.150
(2.17)*
0.402
(1.00)
-1.146
(1.55)
1.510
(1.88)
-0.733
(2.06)*
2.877
(0.26)
51
0.27

(2)
1689-1795
-0.024
(0.23)
-0.176
(1.78)
-0.078
(0.96)
-0.134
(1.59)
0.074
(0.86)
-0.023
(0.31)
-0.322
(1.68)
0.198
(0.95)
0.142
(0.85)
-0.239
(1.48)
-0.083
(0.02)
107
0.11

(3)
1796-1870
-0.128
(1.12)
0.102
(0.96)
0.089
(1.22)
-0.021
(0.28)
-0.177
(1.99)
-0.128
(1.61)
0.215
(1.40)
-0.374
(1.92)
0.014
(0.07)
0.151
(0.90)
-1.238
(0.31)
75
0.20

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Wildberg fertility
(1)
(2)
1651-1688
1689-1795
L. Marriages
-0.135
-0.262
(0.78)
(2.97)**
L2. Marriages
0.288
-0.265
(2.00)
(3.22)**
Deaths
-0.088
-0.066
(1.70)
(2.12)*
L. Deaths
0.013
-0.034
(0.20)
(1.62)
L2. Deaths
-0.007
-0.025
(0.08)
(0.94)
L3. Deaths
-0.022
-0.020
(0.27)
(0.84)
Rye prices
0.051
0.020
(0.46)
(0.42)
L. Rye prices
-0.277
-0.042
(1.72)
(0.75)
L2. Rye prices
0.172
-0.076
(1.21)
(1.51)
L3. Rye prices
-0.034
-0.001
(0.37)
(0.02)
Constant
1.124
-0.530
(0.49)
(0.48)
Observations
36
107
R-squared
0.35
0.27
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

(3)
1796-1870
-0.064
(0.49)
-0.149
(1.20)
0.039
(0.92)
0.061
(1.70)
0.049
(0.94)
0.080
(1.65)
-0.006
(0.16)
-0.136
(2.73)**
0.009
(0.17)
-0.060
(1.27)
-0.734
(0.56)
75
0.19

Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Ebhausen fertility

L.
L2.
Deaths
L. Deaths
L2. Deaths
L3. Deaths
Rye prices
L. Rye prices
L2. Rye prices
L3. Rye prices
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1634-1688
-0.262
(1.45)
-0.118
(0.44)
-0.084
(1.51)
-0.030
(0.57)
0.036
(0.75)
0.045
(1.02)
-0.108
(0.91)
-0.007
(0.03)
0.081
(0.37)
-0.195
(1.48)
-0.755
(0.18)
32
0.25

(2)
1689-1795
-0.194
(1.86)
-0.211
(2.04)*
-0.093
(3.23)**
-0.046
(1.68)
-0.035
(1.08)
-0.015
(0.63)
-0.072
(1.17)
0.022
(0.25)
-0.068
(0.91)
-0.023
(0.40)
-1.231
(0.82)
107
0.24

(3)
1796-1870
-0.109
(0.78)
0.038
(0.30)
0.010
(0.27)
0.117
(3.57)**
-0.029
(0.60)
-0.016
(0.36)
0.104
(1.77)
-0.171
(2.06)*
-0.069
(0.94)
0.074
(1.28)
-0.447
(0.27)
75
0.38

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Wildberg mortality

L. Deaths
L2. Deaths
Rye prices
L. Rye prices
L2. Rye prices
L3. Rye prices
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1651-1688
-0.241
(2.03)
-0.339
(3.18)**
-0.346
(1.53)
0.399
(1.15)
0.179
(0.51)
-0.018
(0.09)
0.570
(0.09)
38
0.42

(2)
1689-1795
-0.051
(0.56)
-0.089
(1.01)
0.124
(0.62)
0.433
(2.24)*
0.462
(2.74)**
-0.470
(3.32)**
0.636
(0.15)
107
0.29

(3)
1796-1870
-0.135
(1.31)
-0.311
(2.53)*
0.008
(0.07)
0.068
(0.40)
-0.092
(0.58)
0.199
(1.59)
1.199
(0.31)
75
0.11

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Ebhausen mortality

L. Marriages
L2. Marriages
Rye prices
L. Rye prices
L2. Rye prices
L3. Rye prices
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1634-1688
0.022
(0.14)
-0.211
(1.42)
-0.679
(1.19)
1.247
(1.34)
-0.732
(0.74)
0.938
(0.77)
-3.726
(0.21)
52
0.15

(2)
1689-1795
-0.213
(2.40)*
-0.064
(0.67)
-0.087
(0.32)
0.646
(2.85)**
0.244
(0.84)
-0.177
(0.74)
-1.997
(0.36)
107
0.16

(3)
1796-1870
-0.202
(2.25)*
-0.242
(1.61)
-0.020
(0.10)
0.008
(0.03)
-0.049
(0.21)
0.122
(0.74)
0.237
(0.04)
75
0.09

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Mortality adjusted for infant deaths; see text. L1, L2,
etc, are lags of variables
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Appendix Table C.2: Goodness-of-fit of the regression models
1634-1688
Wildberg Ebhausen
Nuptiality model
All regression coefficients zero

1689-1795
Wildberg Ebhausen

1796-1870
Wildberg Ebhausen

1.590
(0.163)

3.500
(0.002)

6.170
(0.00)

1.680
(0.097)

1.950
(0.055)

2.190
(0.029)

Lags of dependent variable are zero

0.740
(0.487)

1.400
(0.259)

2.990
(0.055)

1.590
(0.201)

0.900
(0.410)

1.290
(0.282)

Mortality impacts are zero

1.470
(0.239)

1.520
(0.214)

9.740
(0.00)

1.370
(0.251)

1.960
(0.111)

1.740
(0.152)

Price impacts are zero

1.000
(0.422)

1.260
(0.301)

8.450
(0.00)

1.130
(0.346)

0.710
(0.590)

2.560
(0.047)

2.330
(0.042)

2.360
(0.047)

5.310
(0.00)

3.100
(0.002)

3.200
(0.002)

4.820
(0.00)

Lags of dependent variable are zero

2.050
(0.149)

1.070
(0.362)

9.060
(0.00)

3.540
(0.033)

0.720
(0.491)

0.350
(0.706)

Mortality impacts are zero

0.850
(0.509)

1.590
(0.214)

1.820
(0.131)

3.530
(0.010)

1.210
(0.315)

4.270
(0.004)

Price impacts are zero

1.960
(0.131)

0.850
(0.511)

1.350
(0.258)

0.870
(0.487)

4.930
(0.002)

4.580
(0.003)

7.960
(0.00)

1.040
(0.413)

9.870
(0.00)

2.910
(0.012)

2.410
(0.036)

1.180
(0.328)

Lags of dependent variable are zero

6.810
(0.003)

1.930
(0.156)

0.780
(0.463)

2.890
(0.060)

4.240
(0.018)

2.760
(0.071)

Price impacts are zero

2.930
(0.036)

0.590
(0.669)

13.320
(0.00)

3.780
(0.007)

0.830
(0.510)

0.210
(0.929)

Fertility model
All regression coefficients zero

Mortality model
All regression coefficients zero

Figures are F-statistics associated with given null hypothesis, computed from the
regressions reported in Table C.1. Rejection probability in parentheses. The first period
for Wildberg is 1651-1688.
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